

ROUTINE

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Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002400080011-6

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

5 APR 1976

The Honorable Robert Ellsworth  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Bob:

Thank you for your letter of 24 March concerning intelligence compartmentation.

The JCS study you sent along is an impressive account of the frustrations which operational commanders and their subordinates perceive in trying to use various kinds of controlled intelligence for tactical and warning purposes. On the other hand, although the JCS study does address the subject of protecting sources and methods on which such intelligence depends, it does not handle this aspect adequately.

I can fully understand the study's emphasis on utility, but I must be concerned with this other aspect because the primary responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods is mine. Accordingly, I am having this aspect of the JCS proposals reviewed. Nevertheless, I am convinced that some actions can and must be taken to facilitate the timely flow of intelligence to all who need it without unnecessarily jeopardizing these sensitive sources and methods.

As you know, I have a committee of senior intelligence officers representing the primary collectors, processors, and producers concerned with specially controlled intelligence. Sam Wilson and DIA officials are on this group, and representatives

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from three Unified Commands participated in the deliberations of this committee. Ed Proctor, the chairman, has informed me that the actions necessary to make fundamental changes fall into the following categories:

- Actions to expedite changes in procedures which have already been authorized but not fully implemented in the field. (DIA and COMIREX have been tasked to identify any such situations and take remedial action.)
- Actions to modify present reporting procedures by identifying the source-revealing portions of information reports so that customers can use the non-sensitive portions without time-consuming referral to the originators of the reports. (NSA and DDO/CIA have taken on the task of devising such modifications and of applying them at least on an experimental basis.)
- Actions which the DCI has the authority to take, such as simplifying the codeword control systems
- Actions to obtain Presidential approval to change such things as the classifications of the fact of  
 (A specific proposal is being drafted for my consideration.)
- Actions to obtain new legislation regarding secrecy agreements and criminal penalties for violations of such agreements. (Legislation has been introduced for consideration by the Congress.)

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As you can see some actions are under way to ease the conditions identified in the JCS study. It will take some time to get results because we are dealing with a morass of restrictions which have accumulated over the last three decades, especially during the last 15 years. Until very recently they have served quite well to protect sensitive sources and methods although they have inhibited the full use of intelligence from these sources. We must approach this problem urgently but cautiously by fostering changes to improve the utility of important intelligence without destroying the sources and methods that provide this intelligence.

I truly appreciate the cooperation we are receiving in these matters from the various intelligence elements of the Department of Defense. I welcome your offer of support and seek your patience as we work out solutions to this complex problem.

Sincerely,

/s/ George Bush

George Bush

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Letter to The Honorable Robert Ellsworth  
From the Director of Central Intelligence  
Re: Intelligence Compartmentation

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CONCUR:

[Redacted]

Deputy Director for Intelligence

*1 April 76*  
Date

EWProctor:fbr (1 April 1976)

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